monopoly power, it does not matter who manages the technologies. The same competitive equilibrium results if the workers manage the firm and rent capital, or if the owners of capital manage the firm and rent labour. Only if there are profits does ownership of the technology matter, and then only for income distribution.
The Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie framework, then, is simply not a good one for studying organizations. In this study, we used an alternative equilibrium concept based on the core to study three environments in which the organization arrangement is endogenously determined. First, we consider two adverse selection environments in which organizations arise naturally and are 'important' -by which we mean they are a necessary part of an equilibrium arrangement. In these cases, the resulting equilibrium allocation is a Pareto optimum given resource and incentive constraints. In the third example private information is not a problem, but coalitions are still important. There, the technology is such that it cannot be traded in decentralized markets.
It can be argued that having 'important' organizations is a significant advance in equilibrium theory. Potentially, this makes the theory easier to relate to data, since economic data are almost always gathered along organizational lines. In addition, since our approach does not take organizational structure as given, it can in principle be used to predict the consequences of interventions to which arrangements are not invariant.
There may also be significant advantages to the use of equilibrium analysis in the study of organizations, themselves. In our examples the structure of efficient organizations depends crucially upon the characteristics of the environment. And, if technological and legal constraints permit the formation of such organizations, they will be formed. In every sense, organizations are endogenous here and there is no good basis for assuming a priori what their structure will turn out to be.
One example helps illustrate the problems that may result from imposing organizational structure on an environment. This is an insurance example, and, as it turns out, the preferred form is a 'participating' organization, in which insurance contracts are conditioned on group loss experience. Such organizations are actually quite common among life and casualty insurers, but they have been overlooked in most previous studies of insurance markets. These studies have assumed, instead, insurance firms which write contracts conditional only on the state realization of one individual, the insured.
In the cases we consider where private information is an essential feature, we are hardly the first to notice that the structure of organizations is important. Miyazaki (1977) , for instance, pointed out that in adverse selection environments the organization of production is potentially important in achieving efficiency. Smith and Stutzer (1987) point out that, in adverse selection environments with aggregate uncertainty, mutual insurance firms should co-exist with investor-owned firms. However, earlier studies impose the presence of certain kinds of firms. The objective of this study is to predict the kinds of organizations that might emerge endogenously in these environments.
EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPT
For our purposes a core-type definition of equilibrium is a natural choice, simply because we wish to predict what kinds of organizations, or coalitions of agents, will form. It is true that in many environments, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations and core allocations coincide. In these cases, various organizational arrangements may support the equilibrium allocation(s), but so do market arrangements. For that reason, we would say that organizations are 'not important' in such environments.1
Our examples are not in this class of environment, however. In each, there are elements that render competitive analysis and standard core theory inapplicable. Thus, we develop a modified concept of the core, not unlike that employed in economies with public goods (see, e.g., Foley, 1970; Richter, 1974; and Starrett, 1973) . The first two examples are characterized by private information prior to contracting -the adverse selection problem. Here individual rationality constraints for forming a coalition are part of the requirements for a potential coalition to block an arrangement.2 The third example environment is a dynamic one. Here, the key feature is that future arrivals cannot be part of coalitions blocking current arrangements. Only when these agents arrive can they join or form new organizations. Once we adopt the core-theoretic framework, one fact becomes quite clear. The rich have an important strategic advantage, for it is they who pay the subsidy, and they who can withhold it. The poor have no comparable option. This asymmetry is easily overlooked in the insurance case if one assumes the usual arrangement -that is, firms selling insurance contracts to individual agents whose only options are to buy, or not to buy. In our framework, there are no firms but rather coalitions of rational agents with common interests. They are fully aware of the asymmetry, and will organize in such a way as to take account of it. For this reason, in both these examples there is a unique equilibrium allocation. It is the Pareto optimal allocation that maximizes the utility of rich agents, subject to resource and incentive feasibility. 3 We suspect that this result will also hold for other private information economies in which there is a role for subsidies between the two classes of agents. Although it is not proved here, it applies to the Spence signalling environment (1973) when there are two types of agents. Admittedly, however, we have had little success in generalizing the result to more than two agent types. 3 There is also a so-called 'participation constraint' requiring that poor agents' utility cannot be driven below a certain level (that which they could obtain on their own). 4 Viewing the problem as a sequential Nash equilibrium, Cho and Kreps (1987) have shown that the stable equilibrium is the minimal signalling separating allocation, thus formalizing the intuition in Riley (1979) . In contrast to the environment considered here, they assume agents are not together, which rules out coalitional arrangements. 5 Mutual insurance companies generally issue only 'participating' policies, whereas stock insurance companies generally favour 'non-participating' policies. With a participating arrangement, when total premium collections exceed the amount actually needed to cover claims 
ADVERSE SELECTION EXAMPLES
for some i such that f8i > 0,
for all i such that f8i > 0, and
for all i such that 8i < yi. If / = pt, the block must specify the relative number of agent types in the measure zero residual coalition so that the utilities are defined. In this case, the relative number of any type in the residual coalition that strictly prefers membership in the blocking coalition must be less than or equal to its relative number in the population. Finally a core arrangement is any unblocked arrangement. The interpretation of (3)-(5) is as follows. Condition (3) is the standard requirement for blocking to occur.8 Condition (4) states that for all agents represented in positive measure in the blocking coalition, bi(f3) is weakly 7 For technical reasons, an arrangement must specify allocations even when 9 = 0. As the feasible set of allocations F(9) depends only on a?= 02/01, the arrangement must also specify a when 9 = 0. 
Denote the arrangement solving the problem above by a*. This arrangement is feasible by construction, and it is also Pareto optimal given 0.10 In order to prove that a* is an unblocked arrangement it will be helpful to produce a preliminary result about a*. 
where the latter inequality follows from the assumption that (10) is violated. This environment is one in which agents are endowed with private information about investment opportunities. In addition, more such information can be produced at cost. The problems of adverse selection and moral hazard are both present here. We show that financial intermediaries, which are coalitions of agents, arise endogenously and are part of the arrangement supporting the efficient equilibrium allocation. We also show that this allocation cannot be supported with a decentralized securities market. Intermediary-Coalitions exhibit the following characteristics: they borrow from and lend to a large group of agents; they produce information about investment projects; and they issue claims that have different state contingent pay-offs than claims issued by ultimate borrowers. This environment was previously studied by Boyd and Prescott (1986) , and therefore formal proofs are not reproduced here.
Since P2 > P1, (11) and (12) imply that C22(0) > C22(q'). Further, a well-known property of solutions to (P) is that cl l(X) = c12(rj) c1(7q). Then it is possible to show that any solution of the problem (P) must satisfy rqu'[cj(ri) ]K(q) = (P/IP2)-[(1 -P)/(l -P2) ]
The environment All agents live for two periods and have preferences ordered over expected consumption at the end of period 2. Each agent is endowed with a unit of the investment good. In addition, some agents are endowed with a good type investment project, i = g, and others with a bad type, i = b. Project type signals (imperfectly) what a project's return r wil be if it is actually funded. Each agent knows his own project type, which is private information. Except for these project endowments, all agents are identical and there is a countable infinity of them. Agents may use their endowment of the investment good to evaluate a project -their own or someone else's. If a project is evaluated, a signal e = b or e = g is observed. This signal provides additional information about the rate of return on the project, and the evaluation result e is public. Both project type i and evaluation result e help predict a project's rate of return, and knowing both allows a better (but still imperfect) prediction than does knowing i or e alone.
Project scale X is large relative to any agent's unit endowment of the investment good. Thus, when a good project is obtained, efficiency requires that many agents invest their funds in it.
Obviously, this is an adverse selection environment due to the heterogeneous and private project-endowments. Depending on parameter values, however, it can also be a moral hazard environment. Suppose that, without the privateness of project type i, it would always pay to evaluate type i = g projects and never pay to evaluate type i == b projects. In such environments, a sort of moral hazard may obtain, if type i b endowed agents choose to misrepresent their project type and claim to have type i = g. If such projects are actually evaluated (and we shall show that this can occur in equilibrium), a deadweight loss will result.
We restrict parameter values so that, when all type i = g proj ects are evaluated and those that obtain a good evaluation are fully funded, some of the investment good will still remain. As a result, there will always be some investment in 'marginal' type i -b projects. 
An equilibrium with Intermediary-Coalitions
There is, however, a form of organization which gets around the problem, and in so doing results in a Pareto superior allocation -the feasible allocation that maximizes the utility of type i = g agents. We call this form of organization an 'Intermediary-Coalition' and show that if such organizations are permitted to form, they will. If they do, of course, the securities market allocation described above is no longer an equilibrium allocation.
The basic structure of an Intermediary-Coalition is as follows. It is composed of a large number n of type i = b agents, each of whom agrees to evaluate one project. n project owners or 'entrepreneurs' contract with the coalition and will receive cgg units of the consumption good if the project has evaluation e = g and return r = g, and zero units otherwise. The coalition also contracts with 'depositors' who deliver their unit of the consumption good to it. In return, they are promised cb units of the consumption good in period 2. After paying off all entrepreneurs and depositors, coalition members are residual claimants and share equally in its profits.
The investment strategy of the Intermediary-Coalition is first to invest fully in all the type i = g, e = g projects it discovers. Then, remaining funds are invested in the type i = b projects of depositors or evaluators.
We shall not formally set out the conditions for equilibrium here. However, they require that type i = b agents be indifferent between being evaluators, depositors, and mimicking type i = g agents. Setting cgg and c1 at the appropriate values will produce this result and will also satisfy the two resource constraints. It is very important that each Intermediary-Coalition be large, so that it obtains the expected fraction of type i = g, e = g projects. If, by chance, it were to obtain too many such projects, it could not fund all of them and the arrangement would be inefficient.
As residual claimants, the evaluators have no incentive to wastefully evaluate type i = b projects. Thus, these Intermediary-Coalitions solve the 'mimicking problem' in a way that a securities market cannot do. Indeed, as we show elsewhere, an arrangement with many such organizations supports a core equilibrium allocation that is essentially unique. These organizations have two key features, neither of which is present in the decentralized securities market. First, they pool many projects so that the law of large numbers can work. And second, they separate evaluators into a distinct class of agents who become equal residual claimants against the returns from a large pool of projects.
THIRD EXAMPLE: DYNAMIC COALITIONS
Coalitions were needed in the previous two examples to mitigate (as well as possible) the adverse selection problem. The final example is taken from Boyd (1987a, 1987b) . In this environment dynamic production coalitions, or firms, play an important role. The reason coalitions are essential in this case is that the production technology is embodied jointly in the current coalition members; that is, in the organization. Because of this jointness, markets for human capital are inoperative. An individual's marginal product is higher if that member and other members remain in the coalition together.
Technology is lost if the coalition is dissolved.
A member's productivity may depend not only on what he knows but also on what he knows about other coalition members' knowledge. The idea is that an organization is a mechanism for internalizing externalities associated with the production and use of information. In this sense organizations are playing the same role in this environment as they did in the financial Intermediary-Coalition environment just reviewed. A final feature of this economy is that organizations have a life of their own which exceeds that of their members. In our example, people live but two periods, with a new cohort being born every period. Organizations, on the other hand, live forever. The specific example, for which there is sustained growth without exogenous technological change, is as follows. 
The environment
which is just the condition that the contract (kt+ 1, Yt) results in the marginal rate of substitution between consumption when young and consumption when old being equal to the marginal rate of transformation. Another condition is that the number of workers joining the coalition be optimal from the point of view of existing coalition members. This first-order condition is f'(l) -yg'(l) -y = 0.
Equations (18) 
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This equilibrium can be thought of as a sequential core. At the beginning of each period coalitions gain new young workers, and at the end of each period they lose old members through retirement. In evaluating the desirability of joining a coalition, the young must take into account what core or equilibrium consumption they will realize in the subsequent period, conditional on the expertise they and co-workers receive in the current period.
